Michigan Law Review
Volume 86

Issue 6

1988

Law, Science, and History: Reflections Upon In the Best Interests
of the Child
Peggy C. Davis
New York University Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Family Law Commons, Judges Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Peggy C. Davis, Law, Science, and History: Reflections Upon In the Best Interests of the Child, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 1096 (1988).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol86/iss6/4

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

LAW, SCIENCE, AND HISTORY:
REFLECTIONS UPON IN THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
Peggy C. Davis*
IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD. By Joseph Goldstein, Anna
Freud, Albert J. So/nit, and Sonja Goldstein. New York: The Free
Press. 1986. Pp. xix, 236. Cloth, $15.95; paper, $8.95.

"GoldsteinFreudandSolnit" is a common term in the parlance of
lawyers concerned with child custody and parental rights. It evokes a
familiar set of beliefs about child development and child placement
decisionmaking. The term is regularly intoned in family proceedings
as authority for the view that assuring continuity of care should be the
virtually exclusive criterion for child placement determinations. It is
invoked to urge a process of identifying the adult with whom a child is
primarily bonded - the child's "psychological parent" - and protecting the permanence and autonomy of the psychological parentchild relationship.1
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit have promoted these beliefs in concise, accessible volumes addressed to legal, child welfare, and mental
health professionals. 2 In the legal context, the authors' goal has been
"to provide a basis for critically evaluating and revising [consistently
with their beliefs about psychological parenthood] the procedure and
substance of court decisions, as well as statutes." 3 In this, they have
had notable success. The theories and recommendations of these
scholars have stimulated a significant, albeit incomplete, restructuring
of statutes and common law governing child placement decisionmaking.4 The effect of psychological parent theory upon legislative
* Professor of Law, New York University Law School. B.A. 1964, Western College for
Women; J.D. 1968, Harvard Law School. - Ed. Support for the preparation of this review and
for research concerning the Civil War Amendments was provided by the Filomen d' Agostine and
Max E. Greenberg Research Fund of New York University School of Law.
1. It is also invoked - rightly, but too infrequently - to urge haste in determining child
placement issues. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD 40-49 (1979) [hereinafter BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS].
2. See BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note l; J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT,
BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979). Sonja Goldstein was not an author of the
earlier works.
3. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 1, at 5.
4. See Davis, "There Is A Book Out ... ·~ An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative
Facts, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1539 (1987) [hereinafter Davis]; Taub, Assessing the Impact of Goldstein, Freud, and So/nit's Proposals: An Introductory Overview, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 485 (1983-84).
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schemes has been complex and interesting. 5 Its effect upon judicial
applications and elaborations of law has been more controversial. 6
Like other conspicuous demonstrations of the power of a scientific theory to influence the law, the impact of psychological parent theory
upon judicial decision making has led - predictably and appropriately - to concern about the processes by which outcomes are determined and changes in law are effected.
Professors Goldstein and Solnit are distinguished legal scholars,
and their view that judge-made law must change in response to psychological parent theory is expressed with an uncommon sophistication about legal process. That sophistication has been enriched by
their frequent participation in child placement litigation. However,
the earlier books of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit were not critiques of
legal process, but works of advocacy. In the course of advocating law
reform, these authors were mindful, but not critical, of the processes
by which scientific theory affects legal decisionmaking. They displayed the legal technician's proficiency at marshalling and characterizing precedent to facilitate a desired result, and spoke eloquently of
the process:
There is in law, as psychoanalysis teaches that there is in man, a rich
residue which each generation preserves from the past, modifies for the
now, and in turn leaves for the future. Law is, after all, a continuous
process for meeting society's need for stability by providing authority
and precedent and, at the same time, meeting its need for flexibility and
change by providing for each authority a counterauthority and for each
precedent a counterprecedent. The living law thus seeks to secure an
environment conducive to society's healthy growth and development. 7

They also argued that, regardless of the availability of controlling
"counterprecedent," judges are justified in providing for "the now" by
modifying rules of law "[o]n the basis of knowledge extrapolated from
[the social sciences]."S
In the Best Interests of the Child addresses more carefully the
processes by which judges, in collaboration with lawyers and social
scientists, apply and alter law. Its prescription for assuring just and
accurate results in those collaborations is a scrupulous attention to
interdisciplinary boundaries (pp. 120-21). The central message of the
book is that professionals involved in child welfare matters must be
disciplined to work within the limitations of their respective fields.
The book concludes with two appendices: Stephen Gould's scath5. See Davis, supra note 4, at 1569-79; Taub, supra note 4; Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 423, 449-53 (1983).
6. See Davis, supra note 4, at 1593-98.
7. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 1, at 80-81.
8. Id. at 94.
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ing critique of Buck v. Bell, 9 and a poignant passage from The Autobiography ofMalcolm X. 10 The Gould critique describes a collaboration
between law and social science in which early (and now discredited)
teachings of eugenics informed a Supreme Court decision to deny constitutional protection of a fundamental right of family - the right to
procreate. The Malcolm X passage describes a collaboration between
law and social science in which child welfare and mental health experts informed a lower court decision to sever the legal bonds that
preserved a troubled, but arguably viable, family unit, institutionalize
the mother, and place the children in various foster and adoptive
homes. The appendices receive little attention in the text. These powerful and powerfully told stories are simply offered; their implications
for lawyers and scientists working across disciplinary boundaries are
not probed. Yet, by their independent force, they enrich our understanding of the dimensions of difficulty involved in integrating law and
science without sacrificing justice or oversimplifying notions of
accuracy.
This review essay consists of two parts. Part I examines the
boundary adherence techniques advocated in In the Best Interests of
the Child and discusses their potential as controls against inappropriate judicial incorporation or rejection of scientific knowledge. It argues that when science becomes relevant to lawyering or to judging, it
is wise, but insufficient, to leave the law to the legal professionals and
the science to the scientists. The difficulties of assuring just and accurate results in these interactions require that professionals find objective measures of the reliability and impartiality of scientific judgments
and screen out those judgments that fail to meet the measure.
Part II takes the appendices as a focal point for examining a second dimension of difficulty in law-science interactions. The appendices demonstrate that deference to the teachings of social science can
lead courts to compromise deeply valued rights of family autonomy.
Part II argues that lawyering and judging at the borders of law and
science require recognition of this possibility. It is not sufficient that
scientific judgments be professionally made and screened for accuracy. The shaping and application of law in response to scientific
truths are complex, multidisciplinary processes that require circumspection: for accuracy is elusive, truths are neither timeless nor absolute, and claims of science may be in tension with compelling,
historically based claims of political and legal theory. The excerpt
from The Autobiography of Malcolm X describes the destruction of
9. P. 127, appendix 1 (reprinting Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, 93 NATURAL HISTORY 14
(July 1984)) (examining the lives affected by Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)).
10. P. 142, appendix 2 (reprinting MALCOLM x & A. HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OP
MALCOLM X 12-21 (1965)).

May 1988]

Best Interests of the Child

1099

Malcolm X's family as "modem day slavery." 11 The analogy is surprisingly rich. The fourteenth amendment was conceived by people
who regarded slavery's denial of family rights as a uniquely deplorable
usurpation of fundamental human entitlements. Rights of family were
explicitly included among the rights that the fourteenth amendment
was designed to safeguard. Part II draws upon the slavery analogy to
offer a previously unrecognized constitutional basis for cautious judicial scrutiny of scientifically supported infringements upon rights of
family.12

I.

LAW, SCIENCE, AND THE LESSON OF BOUNDARY ADHERENCE

At one level, the maxim, "Thou shalt not lightly cross professional
boundaries," has self-evident merit. Few lawyers and judges are professionally trained in the sciences. With respect to a child welfare issue, humility vis-a-vis the child development specialist is appropriate.
Few scientists are professionally trained in the law. With respect to
questions of law, humility vis-a-vis the legal specialist is appropriate.
The authors enrich this maxim by adding a valuable corollary.
When law and science professionals collaborate to resolve a controversy, it is important that they expose particular sorts of professional
premises that might be relied upon in fashioning a resolution (pp. 5859, 74). This technique of explicating premises is applied differently
with respect to legal and scientific disciplines.
Scientific experts are encouraged to communicate scientific conclusions fully, and to report any reliance upon lay understandings oflegal
rules (p. 74). The beliefthat experts must expose scientific premises to
legal professionals stems from two axioms of legal process. First, scientific judgments may be relevant to the determination of a matter
under existing legal standards. When this is so, the risk of an erroneous determination is reduced to the extent that scientific expertise is
fully available to legal professionals. Second, law may, and should
under some circumstances, change to reflect knowledge gleaned from
the sciences. 13 Expert knowledge that appropriately commands adjustment of legal rules is, therefore, equally necessary to the lawyering
and judging functions.
The authors' insistence that scientists expose reliance upon lay interpretations of the law stems from a wish to avoid inappropriate selfcensorship. The concern is that scientific opinions will be withheld
because of a belief that legal rules or customs require their rejection
(pp. 70-74). Self-censorship of this kind would result in withholding
11. Id. at 146 (reprinting p. 21).
12. The constitutional theory set forth in Part II provides an alternative to the theory of
"penumbral" privacy that served as a basis for the elaboration of family rights in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and subsequent cases.
13. See Davis, supra note 4, at 1540-41.
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from the legal process potentially useful information. An expert in
law may see, where a lay person would fail to see, room for incorporation of scientific knowledge to influence an outcome or to advance
legal doctrine.
The authors impose upon law professionals a more limited obligation to explicate premises. Legal professionals are urged to be explicit
concerning any scientific premises upon which they may rely (pp. 5859). This infrequent but laudable practice is advocated because it exposes lay opinion on scientific questions to critical expert evaluation,
minimizing the risk that legal determinations will be made on the basis
of misinformation or uninformed judgment (pp. 58-59). The authors
do not, however, identify a need to inform scientists of the bases of
legal judgments. Their only expressed concern with respect to the scientist's understanding of law is that communication of scientific
knowledge not be deterred by inexpert determinations that the legal
system cannot, or will not, utilize the information. 14
The value of these prescriptions of boundary adherence and interdisciplinary communication is not to be gainsaid. The fault of In the
Best Interests of the Child is that its focus and structure result in an
overstatement of that value. The reader is left with an inappropriate
confidence that justice and children will be served if lawyers lawyer,
judges judge, and scientists inform. This occurs because the critique of
interdisciplinary exchanges is compromised by an understandable but
disabling failure to set aside substantive convictions in the interest of
assuring rigor in the analysis of process. As we have seen, the authors
have firm convictions concerning the appropriate disposition of a
broad category of child placement matters. 15 In broaching the subjects of interdisciplinary boundary adherence and communication,
they set a goal of objectivity: "We have been careful not to let the
force of our convictions and the temptation to reinforce the proposals
we made in the earlier books lead us to find only good practices in
decisions that we like and only poor practices in decisions we dislike"
(p. 12). The goal proves elusive. In the Best Interests of the Child
consists almost entirely of critical reviews of case histories. Good practices are repeatedly illustrated by decisions that are consistent with the
authors' convictions. 16 Poor practices are repeatedly illustrated by decisions that are inconsistent with the authors' convictions. 17
This skewed result flags two artificialities in the sample of cases
14. Pp. 70-74. Part II of this review argues that legal principles require cautious scrutiny of
scientific claims that are offered to justify compromises of fundamental rights. These legal princi·
pies should be understood by scientists and taken into account when scientific opinion is mar·
shalled in the service of legal argument. Law professionals relying upon these principles should
therefore assume a duty to explicate legal premises for the benefit of the scientific community.
15. See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text
16. E.g., pp. 44-53, 56-57, 57-62, 62-64, 64-67, 97-98.
17. E.g., pp. 21-28, 31, 34-37, 70-71, 72-74, 74-78.
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reviewed in the book. First, the sample is virtually devoid of expert
evidence that is inconsistent with the authors' positions. 18 Only one of
the cases reviewed involves an expert who holds a professional view
contrary to those expressed in the earlier works of Goldstein, Freud,
and Solnit. 19
Second, professionals who disagree with the authors' child development theories are presumed to act without scientific basis, while
professionals who agree with their theories are presumed to act consistently with scientific wisdom. When legal professionals look beyond
expert witness advice to reach results that are consistent with psychological parent theory, they are described as having crossed professional
boundaries in appropriate ways (pp. 57-67). These legal professionals
are credited with having properly applied principles of child development. 20 Legal professionals who rest their decisions upon independently held scientific theories that are inconsistent with the authors'
positions are condemned for having usurped the clinical role (pp. 2137). The possibility of correct reliance upon independently acquired
expert views that are inconsistent with the views of the authors is not
considered. The legal professionals involved in these cases have violated the rule of explication of scientific premises. Whether they have
silently deferred to extra-record scientific knowledge, we cannot know.
As a result of these artificialities, the authors have created a universe in which law and science interact in only three scenarios:
(1) Law professionals learn from expert witnesses who are almost always right in their scientific judgments; (2) Law professionals learn
from reading or associating over time with scientists who are always
right in their scientific judgments; and (3) As a result of independent
evaluation of scientific matters, law professionals make scientific judgments that are always wrong. In this universe, all is well if professional boundaries are respected and law professionals receive, accept,
and follow the teachings of science. The real world is a different place,
and the differences are telling.
18. Pp. 34-37. There is a body of expert opinion that contradicts the authors' views. See
Davis, supra note 4, at 1545-46.
19. This expert is a case worker whq is faulted for her failure to seek the advice of a mental
health professional. Pp. 34-37. All other experts accused of improper practices are doctors and
social workers who adhered to the views of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, but failed to advance
those views on the ground that the law, the participating lawyers or the assigned judge was
hostile to the "right" result. Pp. 70, 72-74, 74-78. These clinicians are criticized for having
misused knowledge oflaw, such as the fact "that the court 'never' denied fathers the right to visit
unless ... there was evidence of physical abuse," (pp. 70-71 ); that a particular court demanded
clinical assessments even when they were useless and detrimental, (pp. 71-72); or that biological
parents would eventually achieve custody of their children regardless of clinical counterindications, (p. 73).
20. The authors commended, for example, a judge's ability to learn "from their work with
child development experts ... that the custody of a child who has thrived in long-term care with
the same foster family cannot be changed without harming him." P. 55.
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A. Expert Witnesses Are Not Always (or Almost Always) Right
One of the greatest mistakes we can make is to regard as simple what is
complex. If psychiatrists and psychologists knew how to achieve a
child's best interests, deciding child custody cases would be comparable
to diagnosing and treating a known medical condition. But psychiatrists
and psychologists don't know ....21

The court quoted above rested its assertion of the fallibility of expert
judgments upon a record of expert disagreement in the case before it. 22
When a legal matter involves a battle of experts, it is obvious that
experts can err, and it is inevitable that the legal professionals' approach to expert evidence will be critical, rather than simply deferential. This is desirable. The rights of parties and the development of
law are as easily compromised by deference to mistaken or incomplete
scientific judgments as by ignorance.
Unfortunately, evenly matched expert battles are not an inevitable
feature of the adversary system. This point is particularly telling in
the context in which the authors consider law and science interactions.
Child placement matters are rarely litigated with luxurious legal and
expert resources. Expert evidence is frequently available only to one
side or only to the court, exercising its power to solicit independent
professional evaluations. As a result, the maxim of deference to expert
opinion is not regularly moderated by the reality of conflicting expert
evidence.
To recognize the desirability of moderation and amplification of
the maxim is not to overlook its importance. Deferential and critical
postures can be consistent. Although the mental health professional is
less than perfect in her ability to determine the best course of child
development, her determination is more richly informed than that of a
lay person. Nevertheless, experts are fallible. Legal professionals are
obliged, therefore, to be sensitive to factors that affect the reliability of
expert opinion. 23
Some of these factors are inherent in adversarial legal process.
When law and science interactions occur in litigation, there is a risk
that expert opinion is biased or shaded by the expert's association with
one of the competing adversaries. There is the additional risk that
resource imbalances will preclude or impede challenges of expert evidence offered by the more richly endowed litigator.
Other risk factors are inherent in the scientific process. The want
of omniscient experts requires sensitivity to the risks that expert opinion is biased for reasons that precede the assumption of an adversarial
21. In re Donna W., 325 Pa. Super. 39, 58, 472 A.2d 635, 645 (1984) (emphasis in original).
22. 325 Pa. Super. at 58, 472 A.2d at 645.
23. This is important when expert opinion shapes the interpretation of facts relevant to application of established rules of law. It is imperative when expert opinion informs the development
or alteration of rules of law. See Davis, supra note 4, at 1600-02.
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position in litigation; is based upon theoretical premises that are unsound; or is based upon factual premises that are inaccurate. The obligation of the legal professional is not automatic deference, but
respectful, critical scrutiny.
B.

Nonwitness Experts Are Not Always (or Almost Always) Right

The authors accurately observe that in interpreting and shaping
legal rules legal professionals rely upon information that is extra-judicially acquired. As we have seen, In the Best Interests of the Child
applauds this sort of boundary crossing; other legal scholarship has
persuasively established its inevitability. 24
Of course, scientific information acquired outside the courtroom is
no less fallible than that acquired inside the courtroom. There is a
consequent risk that independently acquired scientific knowledge will
be mistaken or incomplete. There is the further risk that it will be
misused or misunderstood by the legal professional working in an unmastered discipline. The authors find the technique of explicating
premises adequate to address these risks. They offer the case of Ross v.
Hoffman 25 as a model of appropriate judicial use of independently acquired scientific information. The Ross judge is commended for having explicated extra-record scientific premises as he announced his
decision. In awarding custody to a long-term caretaker pitted against
a biological mother, the judge noted the reliance upon scientific information acquired by judicial notice:
[T]here is a book out, which is widely read, by three very well respected
professional doctors, Drs. Goldstein, Freud and Solnick [sic], called 'Beyond the Best Interests of the Child' and in that book they point out that
whether any adult becomes a psychological parent over the child is based
upon a day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences.
And if you look at it from that view, Mrs. Hoffman has had this
advantage. 26

The judge surmised that this theory was what a trial expert "had in
mind" when he testified that there was risk in moving the child from a
known to an unknown environment. 27 The action of this trial judge
24. It is conventional wisdom today to observe that judges not only are charged to find
what the law is, but must regularly make new law when deciding upon the constitutional
validity of a statute, interpreting a statute, or extending or restricting a common law rule.
The very nature of the judicial process necessitates that judges be guided, as legislators are,
by considerations of expediency and public policy. They must, in the nature of things, act
either upon knowledge already possessed or upon assumptions, or upon investigation of the
pertinent general facts, social, economic, political, or scientific.
E. CLEARY, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 928 (3d ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted). See also Davis,
An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402
(1942).
25. 33 Md. App. 333, 364 A.2d 596 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976), ajfd. as modified, 280 Md.
172, 372 A.2d 582 (1977).
26. 33 Md. App. at 336-36, 364 A.2d at 599 (quoting the Chancellor below).
27. 33 Md. App. at 333, 364 A.2d at 600.
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was affirmed by two appellate courts28 and is applauded by the authors
as an appropriate crossing of professional boundaries. In the Best Interests of the Child reports that this was a case in which scientific
knowledge not only affected an outcome, but also changed the law:
The precedent established in Ross v. Hoffman incorporates generally accepted and generally applicable knowledge from the field of child development. These precedents, in some cases, enable lawyers to argue
against and qualify courts to overturn, without hearing expert testimony,
the presumption in favor of natural parents. Lawyers and judges on
their own can come to recognize many "parent" -child relationships that
should normally not be disturbed. Thus, through judicial precedent the
borders between the professions are opened and may legitimately be
crossed under certain circumstances. [p. 60]

In supporting the Ross outcome and agreeing with its scientific
premises, the appellate courts and the authors of In the Best Interests
of the Child have confronted a bypass of legal process and chosen to
applaud, rather than correct it. It is laudable that the Ross trial judge
"recogniz[ed] and express[ed] that which helped him to decide." 2 9
But the expression came too late. Ms. Ross legitimately complained
that she lacked a pre-decision opportunity to challenge the controversial30 theories upon which her custodial rights ultimately turned. She
was not alerted to the need to seek or offer expert criticism of psychological parent theory. She was not alerted to the need to seek or offer
evidence that it had been misapplied to her situation. If competing
theories were offered in the appellate process, the opinions give no hint
of their consideration. The timing of the explication of scientific premises precluded or compromised use of the mechanisms upon which the
adversarial system relies to promote accuracy and fairness.
After-the-fact admission of professional boundary crossing is preferable to silence, but sound decisionmaking and principled development of the law require more. They require that the parties be alerted
to judicial consideration of extra-record scientific information in time
to refute it. They require inquiry to determine whether the party
against whom the information is to be used has the resources to evaluate and challenge it. They require that extra-record scientific information be tested against a measure of general acceptance within the
relevant discipline. They require attention to the risks that the immediate parties lack the ability or motivation to address the ramifications
of enshrinement in precedent of a principle that may be insufficiently
certain or potent to resolve the range offuture cases to which it will be
applied.
28. See note 25 supra.
29. 33 Md. App. at 338, 364 A.2d at 600.
30. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 n.52
(1977) ("Beyond the Best Interests of the Child ... is indeed controversial.").
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The Sources of Legal Judgments Concerning Scientific Matters
Are Various and Ambiguous

In cases, like Ross, in which boundary crossings by law professionals are approved, the authors applaud after-the-fact explication and
unquestioning acceptance of scientific authority. In cases in which
legal boundary crossings are condemned, the authors identify and denounce an unexplicated result, assuming that full explication would
reveal no scientific authority to which deference has been paid by law
professionals. In fact, unexplained scientific opinions offered by lawyers and judges are often grounded, as the Ross opinion was grounded,
upon a combination of informally acquired scientific knowledge, common sense, and lay speculation. The authors' segregation of these two
categories - appropriately deferential crossing of professional boundaries on the one hand and inappropriate inexpert practice of science on
the other - is misleading. Cases in which judges resort to extra-judicially informed scientific conclusions are more usefully viewed as a
single category as to which the prescriptions of identification, explication, and respectfully critical evaluation of scientific opinion should be
uniformly applied.
The example of inappropriate boundary crossing, identified by the
authors as the case of Lisa Stone, illustrates this point. Counsel for a
child who was the subject of a visitation dispute took the position that
his client's opposition to visitation by a noncustodial parent was pathological (p. 32). Reasoning from their view that psychological parents
must be autonomous, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit have categorically
opposed court-ordered visitation.31 They find the contrary position of
the child's attorney unscientific and wrong (pp. 33-34). The authors
may be right. It may also be that the attorney relied upon independently acquired scientific evidence that maximum contact with noncustodial parents reduces the emotional harm that children suffer as a
result of divorce. 32 It may be that he relied upon a scientist's belief
that in the bitter aftermath of marital dissolution children are commonly influenced, to their emotional detriment, to resent and reject
the noncustodial parent. 33 These scientific views are differently evaluated and reconciled by different experts. Were the attorney for the
child to adhere to the limited terms of the prescriptions of explication
and deference, he would have only to identify scientific authority for
his views. His obligation is greater. It is to seek out the conflicting
expert opinions that bear upon his client's situation and subject those
views to critical evaluation. The corresponding judicial obligation is
31. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note l, at 116-33.
32. See, e.g.• GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY No. 106, DIVORCE, CHILD
CUSTODY AND THE FAMILY 882-87 (1980).
33. See, e.g., Goodstein, Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Divorce and the Psychological Development of Children, in OBJECT Loss IN CHILDREN (M. Scharfman ed.) (forthcoming).
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to assure that this process occurs; that it includes adversarial challenge; and that the solicitation, evaluation, and advocacy of competing
expert views is not impeded by resource limitations.

II.

LAW, SCIENCE, AND THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

If lawyers lawyer, judges judge, and scientists inform, then interdisciplinary collaborations may improve case-specific decisionmaking
and the development of law. This result is not, however, inevitable.
As Part I establishes, the principle of boundary adherence wants elaboration. Interdisciplinary collaboration is more likely to improve legal
decisionmaking if information from the sciences is examined critically.
The story of Carrie Buck gives urgency to the appeal for critical evaluation of scientific opinion. The story of Malcolm X evokes a historical
legacy that provides the nucleus of an argument that critical judicial
evaluation of scientific opinion is constitutionally required when
claims of science challenge claims of family integrity and autonomy.
A.

The Stories of Carrie Buck and Malcolm X

Carrie Buck appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States
for protection of her right to bear children. She was the first target of
compulsory sterilization laws enacted in Virginia in 1924 (p. 132).
The Court denied Carrie Buck's appeal. Its opinion was grounded in
scientific evidence that she, her mother, and her only child were
"imbeciles," (p. 134) and in scientific knowledge that imbecility is heritable (p. 134). Declaring that "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are
enough," 34 the Court established society's right to "prevent those who
are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind." 35 It deterred or
defused constitutional challenge of involuntary sterilizations - of
which there were 63,678 between 1907 and 1964. 36 It has not been
overruled.
Scientists working five decades later have concluded that "there
were no imbeciles, not a one, among the three generations of Bucks,"
(p. 141) and there is now a scientific consensus that although "[s]ome
forms of mental deficiency are passed by inheritance in family lines,
... most are not" (p. 133). Yet, the science that underlay the Buck
opinion was generally accepted in its day, 37 and the initial diagnoses of
Carrie Buck and of her mother were the product of measurement by
the then relatively new, but altogether respectable Stanford-Binet I.Q.
34. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
35. 274 U.S. at 207.
36. Ferster, Eliminating the Un.fit - Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 Omo ST. L.J. 591, 632
(1966).
37. J. AREEN, FAMILY LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 832-33 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter J,
AREEN) (citing HUMAN BETIERMENT AssOCIATION OF AMERICA, SUMMARY OF UNITED
STATES STERILIZATION LAWS (1952)).
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test. 38
The story of Carrie Buck may teach nothing more than that scientific insights deepen and improve over time. If this is so, then we may
rest content in the hope that law grounded in scientific knowledge will
be altered by reasonably paced responses to scientific advances. Professor Gould's telling of the Buck story offers a different lesson and
calls for a less complacent response:
When we understand why Carrie Buck was committed in January 1924,
we can finally comprehend the hidden meaning of her case and its
message for us today. The silent key, again and as always, is her daughter Vivian . . . . Carrie Buck was one of several illegitimate children
borne by her mother, Emma. She grew up with foster parents ... and
continued to live with them, helping out with chores around the house.
She was apparently raped by a relative of her foster parents, then blamed
for her resultant pregnancy. Almost surely, she was (as they used to say)
committed to hide her shame (and her rapist's identity), not because enlightened science had just discovered her true mental status. In short,
she was sent away to have her baby. Her case never was about mental
deficiency; it was always a matter of sexual morality and social deviance.
The annals of her trial and hearing reek with the contempt of the well-off
and well-bred for poor people of "loose morals." Who really cared
whether Vivian was a baby of normal intelligence; she was the illegitimate child of an illegitimate woman. Two generations of bastards are
enough. [An expert witness for the state] began his "family history" of
the Bucks by writing: "These people belong to the shiftless, ignorant and
worthless class of anti-social whites of the South."39

If, as Gould believes, social bias infects and hides behind scientific
judgments,40 then law professionals are obliged to evaluate scientific
knowledge with this possibility in mind. The conclusion that "[t]hree
generations of imbeciles are enough"41 was not simply wrong. It was
both wrong and too lightly made. The Court dealt with a right that is
universally cherished.42 Yet, compromise of the right was easily justi38. See Ferster, supra note 36, at 603-04.
39. P. 137. Attorneys for Carrie Buck offered no challenge of her diagnosis or of the heritability of her alleged condition. Brieffor Petitioner, Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (No. 292).
As evidence of the certainty of the scientific underpinnings of the challenged law, Respondent
offered the opinion of Professor East of Harvard University that "[i]n a quarter of a century laws
of heredity ... [had] been formulated as definite and precise as those of physics and chemistry."
Brief for Respondent at 10, Buck v. Bell, supra.
40. Gould notes in this regard:
Science, since people must do it, is a socially embedded activity. It progresses by hunch,
vision, and intuition. Much of its change through time does not record a closer approach to
absolute truth, but the alteration of cultural contexts that influence it so strongly. Facts are
not pure and unsullied bits of information; culture also influences what we see and how we
see it. Theories, moreover, are not inexorable inductions from facts. The most creative
theories are often imaginative visions imposed upon facts; the source of imagination is also
strongly cultural.
S. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 21-22 (1981).
41. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. at 207.
42. Indeed, the right of procreation was the first right to which the test of strict scrutiny was
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fied because social bias inhibited deference to a basic human entitlement of the affected class and facilitated acceptance of questionable
scientific "truths."
The story of Malcolm X is also the story of state intervention to
affect the lives of members of a disparaged group. It, too, involves
family rights of fundamental character. It, too, may involve scientific
judgments too lightly made. It does not, however, involve a scientific
judgment now "known" to be wrong. It provides, therefore, a more
difficult test of the argument for skeptical scrutiny when science is offered to justify limitation of the fundamental rights of a class that is
the subject of social bias.
Malcolm X describes a childhood prematurely ended and a family
divided by the racially motivated murder of his father and the exercise
of state authority. El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz, as he later came to be
known, spoke with bitterness of the role of the state in the destruction
of his family. After his father's death in 1931, Malcolm's mother was
repeatedly fired as white employers learned that she was the widow of
a "troublemaker." The family was forced to accept welfare payments.
For Malcolm, these payments represented sustenance less than they
represented the beginning of a "psychological deterioration [that] hit
our family circle and began to eat away at our pride."43 We know the
story of the destruction of the family only through the memory of the
man who survived it - to become first a petty criminal and then a
human rights activist of international prominence. It is best told in his
words:
When the state Welfare people began coming to our house . . . .
[t]hey acted and looked at ... [my mother] and at us, and around in our
house, in a way that had about it the feeling - at least for me - that we
were not people.
. . . My mother was, above everything else, a proud woman, and it
took its toll on her that she was accepting charity. And her feelings were
communicated to us.
. . . She would talk back sharply to the state Welfare people, telling
them that she was a grown woman, able to raise her children, that it
wasn't necessary for them to keep coming around so much, meddling in
our lives. And they didn't like that.
But the monthly Welfare check was their pass. They acted as if they
owned us, as if we were their private property. As much as my mother
would have liked to, she couldn't keep them out. She would get particularly incensed when they began insisting upon drawing us older children
applied. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1941). The Skinner court described procrea·
tion as a "basic civil right[ ] of man.... fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race."
43. MALCOLM X & A. HALEY, supra note 10, at 14 (not excerpted in appendix).
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aside, one at a time, . . . and asking us questions, or telling us things against our mother and against each other.
. . . We really couldn't understand. What I later understood was
that my mother was making a desperate effort to preserve her pride and ours .
. . . [T]he state Welfare people kept after my mother. By now she
didn't make it any secret that she hated them, and didn't want them in
her house. But they exerted their right to come ....
I think they felt that getting children into foster homes was a legitimate part of their function, and the result would be less troublesome,
however they went about it.
And when my mother fought them, they went after her ....
I'm not sure just how or when the idea was first dropped by the Welfare workers that our mother was losing her mind.
But I can distinctly remember hearing "crazy" applied to her by
them when they learned that the Negro farmer who was in the next
house down the road from us had offered to give us some butchered pork
... and she had refused.... It meant nothing to them even when she
explained that ... it was against her religion as a Seventh Day Adventist.
They were vicious as vultures. They had no feelings, understanding,
compassion, or respect for my mother. They told us, "She's crazy for
refusing food." Right then was when our home, our unity, began to
disintegrate. We were having a hard time, and I wasn't helping. But we
could have made it, we could have stayed together. As bad as I was, as
much trouble and worry as I caused my mother, I loved her. 44

A year or so later, Malcolm was placed in a foster home. Eventually,
his mother was committed to a state mental hospital. Malcolm X described the subsequent order making each of her eight children a ward
of the state as "[n]othing but legal, modern slavery - however kindly
intentioned. " 45
We have too little information to know whether the intrusion upon
this woman's parental rights was in th_e best interests of her children.
We do not know her condition, whether it was objectively diagnosed
or whether it was appropriately treated. We do not know what assessments were made by mental health and child welfare professionals or
what theories of child development supported the removal of the children and the termination of her parental rights. We do not know
whether conditions in the household would have been more disabling
to the children than the trauma of family dismemberment. But we can
learn from her extraordinary son to appreciate more deeply the value
of rights lost with the scientific and legal judgments to supplant, rather
than support, the family.
44. Id. at 12-18 (portions excerpted in appendix).
45. Id. at 21.
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The Lessons of the Slavery Analogy

El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz recalls the orders assigning new familial
ties for himself and his siblings and equates them to slavery. This is a
startling insight. It evokes an American historical legacy, a legacy
that is crucial to appreciation of the appropriate scope of constitutional rights of family: It provides guidance, grounded in history and
political theory, for legal professionals who must weigh scientific
claims against fundamental rights of family. It addresses contemporary arguments that certain rights of family are not " 'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition' " 46 and that their enforcement
"represent[s] choices that the people have never made." 47 It therefore
warrants detailed presentation.
The relationship between denial of family integrity and slave status
is well recognized in the scholarship of slavery. Indeed, denial of
rights of family is regarded as a hallmark of slavery:
[T]he slave was always a deracinated outsider - an outsider first in the
sense that he originated from outside the society into which he was introduced as a slave, second in the sense that he was denied the most elementary of social bonds, kinship. "Quern patrem, qui servos est?" (Plautus,
Captiva 574). "What father, when he is a slave?" 48

American slavery followed this pattern.
The condition of the American slave family was a mixed issue of
law and practice. Descriptions of the relevant law are found in treatises of both uncritical and abolitionist scholars. In the former category, Thomas R.R. Cobb, confessing a bias "by . . . birth and
education in [the] slaveholding State [of Georgia]," 49 reported that
the slave had no legally cognizable right of marriage, family inheritance, or parental custody.so
46. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 792
(1985) (White, J. dissenting) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
47. 476 U.S. at 787. Justice White's dissent in this abortion case reflects a continuing debate
concerning the validity of the Supreme Court's recognition of unenumerated rights of family
privacy, integrity, and autonomy. See also Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L. REV. 12 (1971); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
48. M. FINLEY, ANCIENT SLAVERY AND MODERN IDEOLOGY 75 (1980) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
49. 1 T.R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA at X (1858).
50. "The inability of the slave to contract extends to the marriage contract, and hence there
is no recognized marriage relation in law between slaves." Id. at 242-43.
The contract of marriage not being recognized among slaves, of course none of its conse·
quences follow from the contubemial state existing between them. Their issue, though
emancipated, have no inheritable blood .
. . . How far this contubernial relation between slaves may be recognized and protected
by law, is a question of exceeding nicety and difficulty. The unnecessary and wanton separation of persons standing in the relation of husband and wife, though it may rarely, if ever,
occur in actual practice, is an event which, if possible, should be guarded against by the law.
And yet, on the other hand, to fasten upon a master of a female slave, a vicious, corrupting
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William Goodell, writing as an abolitionist, 51 saw the matter no
differently with respect to the legal rights of slaves:
"A slave cannot even contract matrimony, the association which
takes place among slaves, and is called marriage, being properly designated by the word contubernium, a relation which has no sanctity, and
to which no civil rights are attached." 52
... "[T]hese laws do not recognize the parental relation, as belonging
to slaves. A slave has no more legal authority over his child than a cow
has over her calf." 53
"In the slaveholding States, except in Louisiana, no law exists to prevent the violent separation of parents from their children, or even from
each other." 54
"Slaves may be sold and transferred from one to another without any
statutory restriction or limitation, as to the separation of parents and
children, [etc.], except in the State of Louisiana."55

Goodell supports the view that slave family relations were no more
honored in practice than in legai theory. 56 Literature of the mid-nineteenth century reflects the prevalence of this view and suggests the
extent to which it influenced abolitionists' understanding of the evils of
slavery and the importance of family rights to the definition of citizenship. Frederick Douglass, for example, had written that upon the
death of a master he was:
immediately sent [forth] to be valued and divided with the other property. . . . No one could tell amongst which pile of chattels I might be
flung. Thus early, I got a foretaste of that painful uncertainty which in
one form or another was ever obtruding itself in the pathway of the
slave. It furnished me a new insight into the unnatural power to which I
was subjected. Sickness, adversity, and death may interfere with the
negro, sowing discord, and dissatisfaction among all his slaves; or else a thief, or a cutthroat, and to provide no relief against such a nuisance, would be to make the holding of
slaves a curse to the master.
Id. at 245-46 (citations omitted).
51. W. GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 17 (1853)
("We propose ... by an exhibition of the American Slave Code, to test the moral character of
American slaveholding."). The work was published by the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery
Society.
52. Id. at 106 (citing G. STROUD, SKETCH OF THE SLAVE LAWS 61 (1827)) (emphasis in
original).
53. Id. at 113 (citing W. JAY, JAy's INQUIRY 132 (2d ed. 1835)).
54. Id. at 114 (citing G. STROUD, supra note 52, at 50).
55. Id. (citing J. WHEELER, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF SLAVERY 41 (1837)).
56. Id. at 115-21. Anecdotal accounts portray families separated by sale or distanced by the
demands of servitude. Advertisements from southern newspapers offer rewards for the capture
or killing of slaves reported to have run away in order to join family members. For further
evidence of the frequency of slave family disruption, see authorities cited in J. McPHERSON,
BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 38 (1988).
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plans and purposes of all, but the slave had the added danger of changing homes, in the separations unknown to other men.
. . . One word of the appraisers, against all preferences and prayers,
could sunder all the ties of friendship and affection, even to separating
husbands and wives, parents and children. 57

This aspect of slave life was "the greatest perceived sin of American slavery." 58 As such, it was a central concern of abolitionists. Harriet Beecher Stowe wrote in 1853 that "[t]he worst abuse of the system
of slavery is its outrage upon the family; and, as the writer views the
subject, it is one which is more notorious and undeniable than any
other." 59 An anonymous article in the Antislavery Record of 1836 said
that "American slavery, both in theory and practice is nothing but a
system of tearing asunder the family ties, " 60 and described the bonds
among family members as manifestations of "sacred law which slavery
scornfully sets at nought."61
Abolitionists believed that the evils of denying slaves the right of
family went beyond the deprivation suffered by the slave.
Families of both races felt the evil effects of slavery;l621 but, more
57. F. DOUGLASS, LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 95-96 (1962) (emphasis
added).
58. J. McPHERSON, supra note 56, at 37.
59. H. STOWE, THE KEY TO UNCLE TOM'S CABIN 237 (1853). Stowe writes in response to
charges that family separations depicted in Uncle Tom's Cabin were unrealistic or atypical. Her
evidence of the prevalence of slave family disruption includes eyewitness accounts of family separations resulting from slave auctions and advertisements for the sale of slaves. Id. at 259-67, 26876.
60. The Disruption of Family Ties, ANTISLAVERY RECORD, Mar., 1836, at 9 (emphasis in
original). The author asserts that in slaveholding states, "the principal business by which wealth
is acquired is the breeding of slaves." Observing that "this trade takes off not usually whole
families, but the young and the strong," the author says, "[n]ot a slave mother does there live in
the slave-breeding district, who is not liable to lose her son or her daughter the moment her
master shall think it for his interest to sell." Id.
61. Id. at 11. These and other abolitionist views on the family are collected and discussed in
R. WALTERS, THE ANTISLAVERY APPEAL (1976).
62. Abolitionists took the view that slavery corrupted both white and black family values.
They also argued that slavery inhibited the liberty of whites. Goodell wrote of a slaveholder
without liberty to control the education of his children.
Here is a waiting-maid, discreet and pious; or here is a nurse, whom all her owner's
children call "Mammy." A little knowledge ofletters would qualify one or both of them to
teach the little white masters and misses their alphabet. . . . [W]here is the legal protection
of [the owner's] right to select a teacher of the alphabet to his own children? In Louisiana,
he would be subject to one year's imprisonment for teaching such a slave to readl He enjoys
liberty, does he?
W. GOODELL, supra note 51, at 374. This liberty interest was subsequently recognized as being
embodied in the fourteenth amendment. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In further support of the argument that slavery compromised the
family values of whites, Goodell cited an incident apparently much discussed among his
contemporaries:
Look then at the dying Thomas Jefferson, the penman of the declaration that "all men
are created equal," now penning a clause of his last will and testament, conferring freedom
(as common report says) on his own enslaved offspring, so far as the Slave Code permitted
him to do it, supplying the Jack of power by "humbly" imploring the Legislature of Virginia
to confirm the bequests, "with permission to remain in the State, where their families and
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important, so did society. "The Family is the head, the heart, the fountain of society," proclaimed one abolitionist, "and it has not a privilege
that slavery does not nullify, a right that it does not counteract, nor a
hope that it does not put out in darkness."
Destruction of the home fit with slavery's symbolic function as the
exemplar of what could go wrong with society.63

The attention abolitionists gave to the slave family paralleled an
attentiveness throughout antebellum America to the institution of the
family. It reflected a belief - held within and without abolitionist
circles - that the family was not only sacred, but also the foundation
of social order and moral development and the source of individual
comfort and satisfaction. 64
It was in this context of general concern for the family as a social
institution and particular concern for the deprivation of slave family
rights that Congress addressed the slavery question. Family rights
were an explicit concern when Congress acted, through the thirteenth
amendment, to abolish slavery. Family rights were an explicit concern
when Congress acted, through the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
Freedmens' Bureau Bill, to define the rights of freedmen and other
national citizens. Family rights were therefore encompassed when
rights of national citizenship were given constitutional status with ratification of the fourteenth amendment. 65
connections are" - then dying, under the uncertainty whether his requests would be
granted or his children sold into the rice swamps!
W. GOODELL, supra note 51, at 375. The literature of the time also included de Tocqueville's
account of an
old man, in the South of the Union, who had lived in illicit intercourse with one of his
Negresses and had had several children by her, who were born the slaves of their father. He
had, indeed, frequently thought of bequeathing to them at least their liberty; but years had
elapsed before he could surmount the legal obstacles to their emancipation, and meanwhile
his old age had come and he was about to die. He pictured to himself his sons dragged from
market to market and passing from the authority of a parent to the rod of the stranger, until
these horrid anticipations worked his expiring imagination into frenzy.
1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY JN AMERICA 380 (P. Bradley ed. 1956).
63. R. WALTERS, supra note 61, at 58.
64. It is surprising, but important, that feminists and anti-feminists, abolitionists and antiabolitionists, reformers and anti-reformers all directed their attention to the same institution.
Rather than being a mere sentimental convention, concern for the family was bound up with the
most serious social and cultural debates in antebellum America:
Virtually everybody assumed that, when properly structured, the family was crucial to
social stability and to social improvement.... There was ... more unity here than mere
ritual expression of the importance of family life: the family, and relationships usually comprehended within it, were almost uniformly presented as vehicles of social and individual
salvation.
Walters, The Family and Ante-helium Reform: An Interpretation, 3 SOCIETAS 221, 225 (1973).
65. The fourteenth amendment was designed to give constitutional status to the rights conferred by the Civil Rights and Freedmen's Bureau legislation of 1866. This is "[t]he one point
upon which historians of the Fourteenth Amendment all agree, and indeed, which the evidence
places beyond cavil." tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
39 CALIF. L. REV. 171, 200 (1951).
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The Thirteenth Amendment Debates

Concerns for the protection of family rights were regularly reflected in the debates concerning the thirteenth amendment. 66 The debates reflected more than concern regarding the condition of the slave
family. They reflected also the conviction that the familial rights denied to the slave were fundamental and inalienable. The remarks of
Congressman Ingersoll are typical: "I believe that the black man has
certain inalienable rights, which are as sacred in the sight of Heaven as
those of any other race ... and no white man has any right to rob him
of or infringe upon any of these blessings. " 67 Senator Sumner asked
that his colleagues imagine an extraterrestrial visitor beholding the
spectacle of slavery:
[A]stonishment ... would swell to marvel as he learned that in this
republic, which has arrested his admiration, where there was neither
king nor noble, but the schoolmaster instead, there were four million
human beings in abject bondage, degraded to be chattels, ... despoiled of
all rights, even the right of knowledge and the sacred right of family; so
that the relation of husband and wife was impossible and no parent could
claim his own child. 68

Senator Wilson declared that upon ratification of the thirteenth
amendment
The sharp cry of the agonizing hearts of severed families will cease to vex
the weary ear of the nation . . . . Then the sacred rights of human nature, the hallowed family relations of husband and wife, parent and
child, will be protected by the guardian spirit of that law which makes
sacred alike the proud homes and lowly cabins of freedom. 69
66. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1865):
The slave could sustain none of those relations which give life all its charms. He could not
say my home, my father, my mother, my wife, my child, my body. It is for God to judge
whether he could say my soul. The law pronounced him a chattel, and these are not the
rights or attributes of chattels.
(statement of Rep. Creswell); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1369 (1864) ("[Slavery] has
destroyed the sanctity of marriage, and sundered and broken the domestic ties.") (statement of
Sen. Clark); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 221 (1865)
It is strange that an appeal should be made to humanity in favor of an institution which
allows the husband to be separated from the wife, that allows the children to be taken from
the mother; ah! that allows the very children of the deceased slaveholder himself to be sold
to satisfy his merciless creditors.
(statement of Rep. Broomall); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2948 (1864) ("It has been
asserted ... that this thing, slavery, was of divine origin .... What divinity [is there] in tearing
from the mother's arms the sucking child, and selling them to different and distant owners?")
(statement of Rep. Shannon); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2984 (1864)
[T]he condition of ... slaves has been attended with circumstances which not only deprive
them of the common blessings that they were by nature entitled to, but has cast them into
the deepest affiictions, by an unnatural separation and sale of husband and wife from each
other and from their children ...."
(statement of Rep. Kelly) (quoting the Preamble to an Act for the abolition of Slavery in
Pennsylvania).
67. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2990 (1864).
68. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1479 (1864).
69. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1324 (1864).
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Senator Harlan described and condemned as contrary to natural law
the "incidents of slavery." The first two incidents related to rights of
family. The Senator spoke first of marriage:
Some of the incidents of slavery may be stated as follows: it necessarily
abolishes the conjugal relation. . . . [I]n none of the slave States was this
relation tolerated in opposition to the will of the slave-owner . . . .
The existence of this institution therefore requires the existence of a
law that annuls the law of God establishing the relation of man and wife,
which is taught by the churches to be a sacrament as holy in its nature
and its designs as the eucharist itself. 70

Senator Harlan spoke next of the parent-child relationship:
Another incident is the abolition practically of the parental relation,
robbing the offspring of the care and attention of his parents, severing a
relation which is universally cited as the emblem of the relation sustained by the Creator to the human family. And yet, according to the
matured judgment of these slave States, this guardianship of the parent
over his own children must be abrogated to secure the perpetuity of
slavery. 71

For Harlan, and for other abolitionists, the slaveholder's claim of
property rights was illegitimate because it stood in conflict with superior and "inalienable" human rights of the slave - rights that were
"sacred," denied only by laws "shocking to human nature itself,"
rights that were "holy," "necessary to the preservation of virtue in
civil society," and emblematic of the relationship between God and
man. Representative Farnsworth put it in these terms:
What vested rights [are] so high or so sacred as a man's right to himself,
to his wife and children, to his liberty, and to the fruits of his own industry? Did not our fathers declare that those rights were inalienable? And
if a man cannot himself alienate those rights, how can another man
alienate them without being himself a robber of the vested rights of his
brother man? 72

The status attributed to family rights by proponents of the thirteenth
amendment was asserted even more clearly by Congressman Kasson:
[T]here are three great fundamental natural rights of human society
which you cannot take away without striking a vital blow at the rights of
white men as well as black. They are the rights of a husband to his wife
- the marital relation; the right of father to his child - the parental
relation; and the right of a man to the personal liberty with which he was
endowed by nature and by God, and which the best judicial authorities
of England have for a hundred years declared he could not alienate even
by his own consent. 73
70. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1439 (1864).
71. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1439 (1864).
72. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (1865).
73. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1865).
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The Debates of the Thirty-Ninth Congress

Congressional debate concerning the reach of the thirteenth
amendment did not end with the amendment's passage.
The congressional battle that raged around ... [the Civil Rights Bill
and the Freedmen's Bureau Act] constituted ... [an] important debate
over the Thirteenth Amendment. By the Amendment, the principle of
universal liberty had been established. The Freedmen's Bureau and Civil
Rights bills represented the efforts of the Amendment's framers, acting
contemporaneously with its ratification, to implement the Amendment
and define the principle. 74

Implementation of the amendment involved containment of the effects
of the Black Codes, by which Southern states sought to perpetuate
incidents of slavery. These codes included measures that compromised the family rights of former slaves. 75 When Congress acted to
invalidate the Black Codes and to interpret and enforce the thirteenth
amendment guarantee of liberty, family rights were again addressed.
In these debates, as in the thirteenth amendment debates, members of
Congress explicitly recognized the fundamental importance of family
rights to the concept of freedom:
Slavery cannot know a home. Where the wife is the property of the
husband's master, and may be used at will; where children are bred, like
stock, for sale; where man and woman, after twenty years of faithful
service from the time when the priest with the owner's sanction by mock
ceremonies pretended to unite them, are parted and sold at that owner's
will, there can be no such thing as home. Sir, no act of ours can fitly
enforce their freedom that does not contemplate for them the security of
74. tenBroek, supra note 65, at 186.
75. The codes uniformly provided for the legitimization of slave marriages. H.R. EXEC.
Doc. No. 118, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866). However, Senator Windom reported from corre·
spondence describing the Black Codes of Mississippi that "Section third [of the freedmen's bill]
compels all freedmen to marry whomsoever they may now be living with, and to support the
issue of what was in many cases compulsory cohabitation.'' CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1160 (1866) (quoting from letter from Lt. Stewart Eldridge to Maj. Gen. Howard (Nov. 28,
1865)). In some jurisdictions, slavery was effectively continued through the device of making
black children the wards or apprentices of whites. The procedure by which this was done dif·
fered from apprenticeship arrangements involving white children in that parental consent was
not required. An example oflegislation establishing this device was offered by Senator Sumner to
illustrate the evils of the Black Codes. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.. 1st Sess. 93 (1865). Senator
Donnelly reported that "[t]he black code of Tennessee provides that ... children [of the vagrant
Negro] may be bound out against his wish to a master by the county court .... " CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong.. 1st Sess. 589 (1865). Similar apprenticeship arrangements were held, in an opinion
by Chief Justice Chase, sitting in the Circuit of Maryland, to violate the thirteenth amendment.
In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D.Md. 1867) (No. 14,247). Turner has been incorrectly cited
as an opinion of the Supreme Court abolishing these apprenticeship practices. See, e.g., H. GUT·
MAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM 410 (1976). The effect of Turner is not
entirely misperceived as a result of this error. An excerpt from a subsequent district court opin·
ion, transmitted to Congress in 1868, says of the case, "This decision ... will govern me in all
future applications of a similar character, unless a different opinion shall be pronounced by the
Supreme Court." S. Misc. Doc. No. 24, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1868).
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home. 76

The first version of the Civil Rights Act spoke in terms of discrimination, prohibiting "any inequality of civil rights and immunities
among the inhabitants of [former Confederate] States." 77 Senator
Sherman proposed that the Act be amended to "secure to the freedmen of the southern States certain rights, naming them, defining precisely what they should be, [and including] the right . . . to be
protected in their homes and family [as a] ... natural right[] of free
men." 78 Senator Sumner also urged specification of the rights of freedmen, including among them the rights "to contract marriage, and to
make any arrangement whatever concerning their family affairs.... " 79
The Act was amended to specify rights to which freedmen were
entitled. The specification included the rights
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person and property, as it is enjoyed by white citizens, and ...
[to] be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none
other. 80

It was understood that the rights of contract, 81 of property82 and of
equal benefit of laws3 encompassed rights of marriages 4 and family
76. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2779 (1866) (statement of Rep. Eliot, speaking with
respect to the homestead provisions of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill).
77. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1865).
78. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1865).
79. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1865) (quoting regulations accompanying the
1861 Proclamation emancipating the serfs of Prussia).
80. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1865).
81. The deprivation of all slave family rights was traced to denial of the right to enter the
contract of marriage. See note 50 supra.
82. Rights of family were, in the nineteenth century, regarded as aspects of the property
rights of men. The language of Representative Wood, speaking in opposition to the thirteenth
amendment, illustrates the point. "The social and domestic relations are equally matters of individual ownership with flocks and herds, houses and lands. The affections of a man's wife and
children are among the dearest of his possessions, and as such are under the protection of the
law." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2941 (1864).
83. The application of the equal protection concept to family rights is illustrated in the full
text of the debates cited at note 84 infra.
84. The understanding that the thirteenth amendment and enforcing legislation affected the
right to marry sparked heated controversy in the Freedmens' Bureau Bill debates over the prospect of miscegenation. In this context, we find two congressmen denying that the right to marry
was conferred by the language of the bill. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 632 (1866)
(statement of Rep. Moulton, denying that the right of marriage was a civil right within the
meaning of the Freedmens' Bureau Bill); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., Appendix at 75
(1866) (statement of Rep. Phelps, denying that the Bill encompassed a right to marry). But most
who spoke on the subject argued or acknowledged that the bill affected marriage rights. Opponents of the bill complained against its scope. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 318
(1866) (statement of Sen. Hendricks, arguing that "[m]arriage is a civil contract, and to marry
according to one's choice is a civil right"); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1866)
(statement of Sen. Johnson, arguing that the right to make and enforce contracts encompasses
the right of interracial marriage); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 418 (1866) (statement of
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integrity. 85
The thirty-ninth Congress went beyond assuring former slaves the
enumerated rights set forth in the Civil Rights Act (and, in slightly
modified form, in the fourteenth amendment). It made them citizens.
Rights of family were understood not only as components of rights of
property, contract, and equal protection, but also as components of
the liberty interests inherent in citizenship status. Senator Trumbull
offered the amendment to the Civil Rights Act that conferred citizenship rights upon freedmen. 86 His subsequent remarks describe the intended scope of the rights to be conferred:
It is difficult, perhaps, to define accurately what slavery is and what liberty is. Liberty and slavery are opposite terms; one is opposed to the
other.
. . . Civil liberty ... is thus defined by Blackstone:
"Civil liberty is no other than natural liberty, so far restrained by
human laws and no further, as is necessary and expedient for the general
advantage of the public." That is the liberty to which every citizen is
entitled . . . .87

When consideration of the Trumbull amendment resumed on the following day, Senator Howard responded to those who argued that Congress lacked the authority to enforce general citizenship rights in
behalf of freedmen; he spoke specifically of rights of family:
[The slave] had no rights, nor nothing which he could call his own. He
had not the right to become a husband or a father in the eye of the law,
he had no child, he was not at liberty to indulge the natural affections of
the human heart for children, for wife, or even for friend .
. . . Is a free man to be deprived of the right of acquiring property, of
the right of having a family, a wife, children, home? What definition will
you attach to the word "freeman" that does not include these ideas? The
once slave is no longer a slave; he has become, by means of emancipation, a free man. If such be the case, then in all common sense is he not
entitled to those rights which we concede to a man who is free? 88
Sen. Davis, arguing that the right of interracial marriage is a consequence of the law). Supporters of the bill acknowledged that the right to marry was implicated, and addressed the miscegenation fear by positing a "separate-but-equal" approach to marriage rights. CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1866) (statement of Sen. Fessenden, arguing that "[the black man] has the
same right to make a contract of marriage with a white woman that a white man has with a black
woman"); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., !st Sess. 322, 420 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull,
arguing that the right of marriage, encompassed by the bill, did not include the right of interracial marriage).
85. Rights of family integrity were understood to flow from the right to create a family by
marriage. See note 50 supra.
86. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., !st Sess. 474 (1866).
87. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., !st Sess. 474 (1866) (emphasis added).
88. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., !st Sess. 504 (1866).
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The Fourteenth Amendment - A Third Force in Law-Science
Interactions Touching Family Life

In this country, the meaning of citizenship developed with reference to the experience of slavery. It was in the process of abolition
that rights of national citizenship were articulated and given protection against encroachment by the states. The fourteenth amendment
assured the constitutional status of fundamental rights that were identified in the thirteenth amendment debates as having been trampled by
slavery, and decreed by the civil rights legislation of 1866 to be the
entitlement of free people. 89
The debates of the thirty-eighth Congress have prompted the observation that "[t]he opposite of slavery is liberty." 90 Denial of rights
of family is of the essence of slavery. It was a prominent and uniquely
detestable feature of American slavery. 91 Appreciation of the need to
protect rights offamily is a legacy of the progression from a slaveholding nation to a nation in which citizenship is a human birthright.
The fourteenth amendment, understood as an embodiment of that
legacy, serves to insulate rights of family. When claims of science
seem to justify curtailment of those rights, special scrutiny is required
to test the objectivity and accuracy of the scientific judgment and the
balance between liberty lost and public policy advanced. Scrutiny of
this sort would have heightened judicial appreciation of the value to
Carrie Buck of the liberty to bear children and the value to Malcolm
X's family of the right to survive as a family. Scrutiny of this sort
would have encouraged critical judicial examination of scientific prognoses with respect to the unborn children of Carrie Buck and the uprooted children of Malcolm X's mother.
Goldstein, Freud, Solnit, and Goldstein have enriched the store of
scientific knowledge upon which lawmakers may draw in advancing
the public good and promoting the interests of children. Their unexplained offering of the stories of Carrie Buck and Malcolm X suggests
that they sense the dangers of uncritical reliance upon that knowledge.
Both the science and the dangers must be appreciated. Law-science
collaborations that affect fundamental rights require more than that
89. See notes 73-88 supra and accompanying text.
90. tenBroek, supra note 65, at 179.
91. The legacy of this feature of slavery is described from the perspective ofa principal character in Toni Morrison's novel of motherhood and slavery:
Anybody Baby Suggs knew, let alone loved, who hadn't run off or been hanged, got rented
out, loaned out, bought up, brought back, stored up, mortgaged, won, stolen or seized....
What she called the nastiness of life was the shock she received upon learning that nobody
stopped playing checkers just because the pieces included her children. Halle she was able
to keep the longest. Twenty years. A lifetime. Given to her, no doubt, to make up for
hearing that her two girls, neither of whom had their adult teeth, were sold and gone and
she had not been able to wave goodbye.... "God take what He would," she said. And He
did, and He did, and He did ...."
T. MORRISON, BELOVED 23 (1987).
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lawyers and scientists know their respective places. They require critical analysis of the competing claims of science and law; humble evaluation of the power of scientists to know; and cautious delineation of
the rights and responsibilities of individuals, functioning within the
"private realm of family life" 92 and of the collective, acting upon scientific knowledge to assure or enhance the well-being of its members.

92. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1943).

